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Lubben: Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B of A in OLA

RESOLUTION, ORDERLY AND OTHERWISE: B OF A IN OLA
Stephen J. Lubben

Since the recent collapse of Lehman Brothers, the problems
associated with large, complex financial institutions have been front and
center.1 Questions remain about how best to handle insolvency,
bankruptcy, or “resolution” of such an institution.2
The discussion is more difficult still because of the high political and
financial stakes. For those steeped in the banking industry, maintaining
the “specialness” of banks and financial institutions necessitates
denigrating the bankruptcy system.3 The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC or Corporation),4 keen to demonstrate its
competency to wield the new powers given it under Dodd–Frank, rushed
to produce a hypothetical resolution of Lehman that amused many by its
 Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in Corporate Governance & Business Ethics, Seton Hall
University School of Law, Newark, New Jersey. Many thanks to Anna Gelpern, Kristin N. Johnson,
Adam Levitin, Michael Macchiarola, Frank Medina, Frank Partnoy, and Michael Simkovic for their
comments on an early draft. Thanks also to the participants in the 25th Annual Corporate Law
Symposium at the University of Cincinnati College of Law for their thoughts on the paper. This paper
is dedicated to Sarah Pei Woo, my co-author all too briefly. I will always wonder what might have
been.
1. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051 (2009);
Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011); Michael C. Macchiarola, Beware of
Risk Everywhere: An Important Lesson from the Current Credit Crisis, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 267
(2009); Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183
(2009); Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671 (2010); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943
(2009); Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2010); Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 707 (2010); Sarah Pei Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy: How Bank Regulation Causes Fire Sales,
99 GEO. L.J. 1615 (2011).
2. See Stephen J. Lubben, Financial Institutions in Bankruptcy, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1259
(2011). As David Zaring explains:
Resolution authority is the polite term for seizing failing financial institutions and either
shutting them down or selling them off for the best possible price. Resolution is meant to
be implemented before contagion sets in and the institutions’ counterparties, including
customers, traders, and even competitors, also fail, either through panic (which is not the
fault of the counterparties) or poor risk management (which is, but still may exacerbate a
crisis). It is a particular kind of instant bankruptcy, destroying the interests of some
creditors quickly and unmercifully, while giving others, especially the bank’s depositors,
a fresh and happy start.
David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 99 (2010).
3. Rodgin Cohen & Morris Goldstein, The Case for an Orderly Resolution Regime for
Systemically-Important Financial Institutions, in PEW FINANCIAL REPORT PROJECT (2009), available at
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy%20page/Cohen-Goldstein-FINAL-TF-Correction.pdf.
4. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., THE ORDERLY LIQUIDATION OF LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS
INC. UNDER THE DODD–FRANK ACT (2011), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/0a72e3a2-694811e0-9040-00144feab49a.pdf.
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naiveté.5
On the other hand, other commentators, in thrall to the healing
powers of markets, have embraced the existing bankruptcy mechanisms
as the best way to address the issue.6 In the process, they tend to ignore
the obvious differences between a corporation with tangible assets and
one whose primary asset is the trust its counterparties place in it.7
Unlike a manufacturing plant, trust is apt to be quite vaporous in times
of financial distress.8
This Article takes a step back from this debate and considers the issue
from a more practical level. What precisely does it mean to “resolve”
financial distress in a complex financial institution?9 What are the
goals—liquidation, reorganization, or simple contagion avoidance?10
And, more precisely, how might such a resolution look under realistic
conditions? Embedded in these questions are larger questions of who
gets to make these choices, and under what circumstances the choices
might change.
I begin by examining the legal and financial structure of a specific,
actual financial institution: Bank of America. The financial institution
in question is one of the “really big” institutions in the United States,
and is selected as a representative of its type.11 This institution is not
presently—the best I know—in danger of default or in need of
resolution, but someday it might be.12
If the FDIC were to resolve this institution under the new Orderly
5. Stephen J. Lubben, The F.D.I.C.’s Lehman Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2011), available
at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/29/the-f-d-i-c-s-lehman-fantasy/; Michael H. Krimminger, No
Fantasy in F.D.I.C. Lehman Paper, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2011, available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/no-fantasy-in-f-d-i-c-lehman-paper/; see also The Orderly
Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 5 FDIC Q. 1 (2011).
6. John B. Taylor, How to Avoid the New Bailout Authority, ECONOMICS ONE (May 5, 2011),
http://johnbtaylorsblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/how-to-avoid-new-bailout-authority.html.
7. See, e.g., Brent J. Horton, How Dodd–Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority for Financial
Companies Violates Article III of the United States Constitution, 36 J. CORP. L. 869 (2011).
8. See Stephen J. Lubben, Systemic Risk & Chapter 11, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 433, 446–47 (2009)
(arguing that chapter 11 can be used to resolve systemically important firms like the automotive firms,
to the extent they are systematically important); see also Ryan Lizza, The Contrarian: Sheila Bair and
the White House Financial Debate, NEW YORKER (July 6, 2009), available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/07/06/090706fa_fact_lizza.
9. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5
(2007) (“Bankruptcy offers three alternatives for addressing the problems of a large public company in
financial distress. The debtor may reorganize the business, sell it as a going concern, or close the
business and sell the assets piecemeal.”).
10. Cf. Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND.
L.J. 951, 968–72 (1992).
11. Matt Taibbi, Bank of America: Too Crooked to Fail, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 14, 2012),
available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/bank-of-america-too-crooked-to-fail-20120314.
12. Susanne Craig, Bank Stocks Get a Boost from Geithner, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2011), available
at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/bank-stocks-get-a-boost-from-geithner/.
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Liquidation Authority in Dodd–Frank,13 it would first have to
understand the business in question. It would be aided in this process by
the resolution plans—or “living wills”—that Dodd–Frank requires such
institutions to prepare and file.14 The financial institution I examine in
this paper has yet to file such a plan—it is not yet required to under
recently enacted regulations—and when it does so, only parts will be
public.15 But it is possible to gain an honest understanding of the
financial institution using existing regulatory reports and other
information made public by the institution.
What this analysis reveals is that no matter how complex Lehman
was, the remaining “too big to fail” financial institutions are infinitely
more complex. Lehman involved myriad legal entities, across several
key financial jurisdictions, but it largely involved a single line of
business.16 On the other hand, most of the remaining large financial
institutions involve not only investment banking, but also commercial
banking and sometimes insurance underwriting.17 The commercial
banking operations, in particular, mean that these institutions are
integrated into the real economy to a far greater degree than Lehman,
and are therefore likely to fail in even more disruptive ways.18
Moreover, all of these institutions have balances sheets that are much,
much larger than Lehman’s—which itself was the largest chapter 11
debtor ever.19 For example, Lehman reported assets of $713 billion
upon filing for bankruptcy, whereas the institution I look at in this paper
reported $2.3 trillion in assets at the end of 2010.20 By way of context,
the World Bank estimates the United States GDP was estimated at $14.5
Trillion in 2010.21
13. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–94 (2010).
14. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (2010). This provision requires, among other things, “full descriptions
of the ownership structure, assets, liability, and contractual obligations of the company . . . .”
15. Stephen J. Lubben, The Problem with Living Wills for Financial Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
16, 2011), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/the-problem-with-living-wills-forfinancial-firms/. See also generally 12 C.F.R. § 381 (2011).
16. See Stephen J. Lubben & Sarah Pei Woo, Reconceptualizing Lehman, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J.
(forthcoming 2013).
17. Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 507, 509 (1994).
18. Martin Wolf, Of Course It’s Right to Ringfence Rogue Universals, FIN. TIMES (Sep. 15,
2011,
7:51
PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f296cc8e-dedc-11e0-913000144feabdc0.html#axzz2GB19Of7H.
19. See Kristin N. Johnson, From Diagnosing the Dilemma to Divining a Cure: Post-Crisis
Regulation of Financial Markets, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1299, 1311 (2010).
20. The Lehman holding company chapter 11 case is In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 0813555 (JMP), while the liquidation proceeding under the Securities Investor Protection Act for the
brokerage operation is In re Lehman Brothers Inc., No. 08-01420 (JMP) (SIPA), both in U.S.
Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York.
21. WORLDBANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE,
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Once the relevant pieces of the institution are identified, in Part II of
this Article I examine the relevant law that would apply to resolution of
the financial institution’s financial distress. I begin with the assumption
that Dodd–Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority will be invoked, but
the fact that I have to make such an assumption itself reveals some basic
uncertainty regarding how to anticipate and price financial distress in
this context.
Even after I decide to invoke the OLA regime, the question of which
law will apply to my targeted financial institution remains an issue.
First, OLA partially invokes other legal regimes to address parts of the
financial institution. Second, OLA is incomplete in its preemption of
other insolvency regimes.
And of course, OLA only applies domestically. As will be seen, not
only does the financial institution I examine conduct extensive
operations abroad, but it also specifically targets investors in other
jurisdictions. For example, it has extensive asset securitization
operations in Canada and the United Kingdom. And recently, it has
issued several billion dollars of debt denominated in Australian Dollars,
Swiss Francs, Canadian Dollars, Japanese Yen, and Euros. Many of
these debt issuances also involve interest rates that float based on the
movements of a local interest rate index. Presumably, these indices are
sensitive to local economic conditions.
While the FDIC, as a potential trustee of the financial institution in
question, would have but a limited ability to change the legal outcomes
in foreign jurisdictions, it must plan for the effects its actions will have
worldwide, particularly if those actions will rebound into the United
States. For example, when Lehman filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in
the United States, its London operations immediately entered
administration in the United Kingdom. That had serious consequences
for several U.S.-based hedge funds that relied on Lehman’s London
operations for their prime brokerage accounts.22
Having then provided a picture of the financial institution and the
legal landscape that would apply upon financial distress, Part III of the
Article considers the interaction of these two elements. This is the core
of the Article, as it addresses the vital question of “what would
happen?”
I assume that the FDIC and other key actors have learned from the
available
at
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=ny_gdp_mktp_cd&idim=count
ry:USA&dl=en&hl=en&q=us+gdp.
22. See Lawrence Cohen, Update on Claims for Lehman Prime Brokerage Assets, GIBBONS
(Nov.
4,
2008),
http://www.gibbonslaw.com/news_publications/articles.php?action=display_publication&publication_id
=2563.
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recent crisis, but I try to avoid assuming the kind of perfection seen in
the FDICs recent Lehman exercise. After all, the French government
learned the lessons of World War I, and it was well-poised to act if
Germany acted in the same manner as it had in 1914. Quite obviously,
that did not mean that France was ready to respond to a different, yet
similar, threat in 1940.
In short, I assume that the FDIC is somewhat prepared and wellintentioned, but not omnipotent.
In Part III, I also consider how the FDIC’s efforts to prepare an
institution for an OLA proceeding might decrease the time the FDIC has
to actually make such preparations. This is the great paradox
understood by reorganization professionals everywhere: the more
preparation that is done for the filing, the greater the risk of an early or
uncontrolled filing, because of premature disclosure of the debtor’s
plans. The FDIC has some experience hiding its preliminary work in
the bank resolution context, but I also examine the ways in which OLA
might be different.
Moreover, in the specific context of financial institutions, I explore
how financial distress in the financial institution I am studying will
likely result in doubts about the viability of other financial institutions
(i.e., financial contagion), in varying intensity depending on the
similarities between the respective institutions. Not only does this have
a feedback effect with regard to the original financial institution, but it
also limits the FDIC’s ability to focus its efforts solely on the first
institution.
At some point the preplanning inexorably gives way to an actual
Dodd–Frank OLA proceeding. As explained more fully in Part III, this
is the point at which FDIC will have to manage the main proceeding
while also coordinating related insolvency proceedings at home and
abroad. The liquidity needs of the distressed financial institution are apt
to be extreme in these initial days, but providing such liquidity will be
key to containing the financial distress within a single institution.
The FDIC will also have to be vigilant, ready to respond to
unforeseen complications and the unforeseen actions of rogue
counterparties who decide that their best course of action lies in selfhelp.
Once the financial institution is stabilized, the FDIC must be prepared
to describe what will happen to the institution and must achieve that
result in rapid fashion. At the same time, the Corporation will need to
gain an understanding of the claims against the financial institution and
implement plans for paying such claims. Throughout the key question
will be, “can this be done quicker than it could under the Bankruptcy
Code?” When the U.S. government conducted a similar exercise during
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the financial crisis with regard to AIG, it seems likely that it overpaid
AIG’s counterparties relative to what they would have obtained in a
chapter 11 case.
Part IV then concludes by considering the implications of the story
told in Part III. While Part III reveals some serious doubts about the
ability of Dodd–Frank to perform as envisioned, it also shows how the
Bankruptcy Code, at least as currently drafted, would be equally
unsuited to the task. Moreover, I explain why adapting the Code to the
resolution of large financial institutions would involved something far
more substantial than a few “tweaks,” as is often suggested. Ultimately
it would involve adopting something that takes many features from both
OLA and chapter 11, while applying the name bankruptcy to the
resulting beast. I have argued elsewhere that greater integration of OLA
and the Bankruptcy Code would be highly desirable, but we should not
pretend it will be an easy task.
I. THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
In this paper I examine Bank of America, a large universal bank—or
as close to a universal bank as is possible in the United States—which is
headed by the BankAmerica Corporation or Bank of America
Corporation, a Delaware corporation originally called NationsBank
(DE) Corporation.23
Already large, between 2006 and 2008, Bank of America acquired
several other institutions, including Countrywide Financial, Merrill
Lynch, MBNA, U.S. Trust, and La Salle Bank. As of December 31,
2010, the entire bank had $2.3 trillion in assets and approximately
288,000 full-time equivalent employees.24 Its broker–dealer units hold
more than $2.2 trillion in client assets. The bank reports that in the
United States alone it has more than 57 million consumer and small
business banking relationships, and the bank held more than $1 trillion
in banking deposits. The company has approximately 5,900 retail
banking locations and 18,000 ATMs throughout the United States.
The parent company’s offices are located in Charlotte, North
Carolina, and its shares are listed on the New York, London, and Tokyo
stock exchanges.25 It also has more than two-dozen types of preferred
23. Whether the parent company is Bank of America Corporation or BankAmerica Corporation
is a bit unclear, since the certificate of incorporation uses both names. Paragraph one of certificate does
state that “The name of the corporation is Bank of America Corporation,” but the introductory paragraph
and the title use the other name. Bank of America Corp., Amended and Restated Certificate of
Incorporation
(Form
8-K)
(Aug.
1,
2006),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70858/000119312507042036/dex3a.htm.
24. Bank of America Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 25, 2011).
25. Id. With regard to the discussion of the subsidiaries I recoded the data to correct obvious
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shares that are listed on the NYSE.
Table 1: Bank of America Capital
(as of June 2011, in millions of USD)

Perpetual Preferred

16,562.20
101.33

Common Stock
Surplus

151,465.35

Undivided Profits

53,254.47
222,175.60

Total Capital

In a broad sense, Bank of America is comprised of two halves: the
original Bank of America, and Merrill Lynch, the investment bank it
acquired on the same day that Lehman filed its chapter 11 petition.26
But the two halves of the bank have been somewhat integrated—for
example, previously outstanding Merrill preferred shares were reissued
by the Bank of America parent company on substantially the same
terms, giving the holders a stake in the combined enterprise, rather than
just the Merrill piece of the operation.
A. Corporate Structure
At the end of 2010, Bank of America, the parent company, had more
than 2,000 subsidiaries worldwide, formed in ninety-seven different
jurisdictions. About forty-five percent of the Bank of America
subsidiaries are formed in Delaware. Just over thirty-eight percent of
Bank of America’s subsidiaries were formed under the law of a foreign
jurisdiction.27 These subsidiaries conduct their business operations in
163 different cities around the world. And while the bank has its

errors. For example, the list of subsidiaries includes separate categories labeled United Kingdom,
England, and England & Wales, which have been combined in Table 1 under the United Kingdom
category. Note, however, that Scotland remains a separate entry on the table, with five subsidiaries. I
have assumed that references to Georgia refer to the American state.
26. See generally GREG FARRELL, CRASH OF THE TITANS: GREED, HUBRIS, THE FALL OF
MERRILL LYNCH, AND THE NEAR-COLLAPSE OF BANK OF AMERICA (2010) (describing the events,
particularly increasing investments in CDOs, that lead to Merrill’s need for a takeover).
27. Defined as other than the fifty United States and the District of Columbia.
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corporate headquarters in North Carolina, New York City is the location
of the largest number of its companies.
Six hundred and thirty-one of the bank’s more than two thousand
subsidiaries, or about 31% percent, are operated from locations outside
of the United States. When the 150 companies located in London are
combined with the other subsidiaries sprinkled about the UK—such as
the two subsidiaries in Hertfordshire and the one in Manchester—it
becomes clear that the United Kingdom is the single largest foreign
jurisdiction with respect to Bank of America’s overseas operations.
Table 2: Bank of America Key Operating Subsidiaries
(as of June 2011)
Description

MBNA Canada Bank
Merrill Lynch Canada Inc.
Merrill Lynch Capital
Services, Inc.
Merrill Lynch
Commodities, Inc.
Merrill Lynch Government
Securities Inc.
Merrill Lynch Professional
Clearing Corp.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith
Incorporated
Merrill Lynch International
Bank Limited
Merrill Lynch Japan
Securities Co., Ltd.
Merrill Lynch S.A.
Banc of America Securities
Limited
MBNA Europe Bank
Limited
Merrill Lynch Commodities
(Europe) Limited
Merrill Lynch International
Bank of America Rhode
Island, National Association
Bank of America, National
Association
FIA Card Services, National
Association

Credit cards

Location

Formation

Outstanding Debt

Jurisdiction

(named entity only)

Gloucester, Canada
Toronto, Ontario,
Canada

Canada

0

Canada

0

Derivatives
Unknown (energy
trading?)
US Government
securities

New York, NY

Delaware

0

Houston, TX

Delaware

0

New York, NY

Delaware

0

Unknown

New York, NY

Delaware

0

New York, NY

Delaware

0

Dublin, Ireland

Ireland

0

Tokyo, Japan
Luxembourg,
Luxembourg

Japan

0

Luxembourg

London, U.K.

United
Kingdom

Investment bank

Investment bank;
holding co.
Universal
banking; f/x
trading in London
Investment bank
Investment bank
Unknown
(investment
bank?)
Holding company
– consumer
lending sub

3,285

Chester, England

Derivatives

London, U.K.

Broker-dealer

London, U.K.

United
Kingdom
United
Kingdom
United
Kingdom

Commercial bank

Providence, RI

USA

0

Commercial bank

Charlotte, NC

USA

6,659

Credit cards

Wilmington, DE

USA

1,000

0

0
0
0

Source: http://investor.bankofamerica.com/ and Bloomberg

The largest number of subsidiaries, and the bank’s corporate
headquarters, are located in obvious financial centers, but there are some
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surprises too. With all due respect to Montevideo, six subsidiaries
operating out of that city might give us pause.
Many of the companies among the thousands that make up Bank of
America are likely to be of little significance. But in a world where a
recent college graduate can incur $2 billion in losses at a major bank, we
should not be too quick to dismiss any seemingly small piece of the
overall picture.
With that proviso, in June of 2011, Bank of America identified
seventeen subsidiaries as among its “major operating subsidiaries.”28 As
shown on Table 2, these companies are located in a variety of
jurisdictions in the United States, Canada, Japan, and Europe. These
companies include three nationally chartered banks, which are subject to
direct regulation by the Controller of the Currency and the FDIC.
Table 3: Bank of America Assets by Location
USD

%

Total Assets

2,264,909

100

Domestic

1,938,417

85.58

America

310,392

13.7

Europe, Middle East and Africa

186,045

8.21

Asia

106,186

4.69

Total Foreign excluding North

Latin America and the
Caribbean
Canada

18,161

.8

16,100

.71

MBNA Canada Bank is a major credit card issuer in Canada, which
Bank of America sold to TD Bank in late 2011.29 Merrill Lynch Capital
Services, Inc. is primary derivatives counterparty in the Merrill Lynch
part of Bank of America.
Merrill Lynch Canada Inc. is an investment-banking arm of Merrill
Lynch & Co. Canada Ltd., which itself is a subsidiary of Merrill Lynch
Canada Holdings Co., Merrill’s top level Canadian holding company.
This makes Merrill Lynch Canada similar to Merrill Lynch SA, which is
Merrill’s continental European investment banking arm.
28. BANK OF AM. CORP., SELECT MAJOR SUBSIDIARIES (2011) [hereinafter SELECT MAJOR
SUBSIDIARIES],
available
at
http://phx.corporateir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9OTk3OTF8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1.
29. Laura
King,
Canadian
Big
Deals,
AM.
LAW.
(Dec.
11,
1998),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202532846748&Canadian_Big_Deals&slretu
rn=20120824213223.
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Interestingly, some of the entities listed by Bank of America as key
subsidiaries do not appear in Bloomberg or other key financial
databases. For example, Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc. is a
subsidiary of MLCI Holdings, Inc., which itself is a subsidiary of
Merrill Lynch Capital Services, the derivatives trader noted earlier.
What precisely Merrill Lynch Commodities does is apparently unknown
to Bloomberg. I hazard a guess that this entity is involved in energy
related trading, given its place in the overall corporate structure and its
location in Houston, but we can hope that the FDIC will have better
information than Bloomberg on points like these.
Even more interesting is how little of Bank of America’s balance
sheet appears on Table 2. For example, the bank reports more than $800
billion in total outstanding debt. Just under $11 billion of that appears
on the table. But this is consistent with prior research that the late Sarah
Woo and myself previously conducted on Lehman: much of the debt
was issued by relatively insignificant subsidiaries, created to take
advantage of regulatory or tax advantages of a particular jurisdiction.30
Similarly, subsidiaries like Merrill Lynch UK Holdings Limited do
not appear on Table 2, despite reporting more than $155 billion in riskweighted assets.31 As it turns out, this makes sense in the strictly literal
sense that Merrill Lynch UK Holdings is a holding company, with no
independent operations. But given that Table 3 shows that Bank of
America has but $188 billion of assets in the whole of Europe, the
Middle East, and Africa, Merrill Lynch UK Holdings’ subsidiaries must
carry a particular degree of risk (as defined in the Basel accords) or
significance.32 In fact, Merrill Lynch UK Holdings is the holding
company for Merrill Lynch International (MLI) and Merrill Lynch
Commodities (Europe) Limited (MLCE), two of the key subsidiaries
identified on Table 2. As reported by Bank of America, MLI acts as a
broker–dealer in financial instruments and provides “corporate finance
services . . . . MLCE is a trader of natural gas, electricity, coal,
emissions and weather derivatives.”33

30. See Lubben & Woo, supra note 16; see also Gillian Tett, Idea of “Living Wills” Is Likely to
Die Quiet Death, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2009, 7:50 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/098ac1ec-882d11de-82e4-00144feabdc0.html.
31. BANK AM., http://investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-basel (last
visited Sep. 19, 2012).
32. See infra Table 3, for more on MLI.
33. BANK
OF
AM.,
PILLAR
3
DISCLOSURES
(2009),
http://phx.corporateir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NzUwMjB8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1.
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Table 4: Bank of America Revenues by Location (2010)
USD
Net Revenues
Domestic

%
110,220

100

87,179

79.1

21,541
12,369
6,115

19.54
11.22
5.55

3,057
1,500

2.77
1.36

Total Foreign Excluding
North America
Europe, Middle East and Africa
Asia
Latin America and the
Caribbean
Canada

Taken together, Tables 2 through 4 provide a picture of a bank whose
key subsidiaries are spread across the globe, while much of its assets
and revenues are still associated with the United States. That is, even
though many Bank of America entities operate overseas, they often
facilitate trading with American counterparties. The following table,
reproduced from the Basel II Pillar 3 Report on MLI, best illustrates
this. Recall that MLI is a London-based broker–dealer, yet more than
half of its credit exposure relates back to the “Americas,” a rather vague
term to be sure.
And it is possible that the location of the assets (see Table 3)—may
be something of a mirage, once the risk of rehypothecation is taken into
account.34 Rehypothecation of collateral involves the reuse of client
assets in a new transaction, as if a pawnshop could grant its own lenders
a lien or similar rights in items left at the store by customers. Many of
Lehman’s prime brokerage customers claimed to be surprised that their
assets had moved to Europe. While contracting will address that
specific problem, other related issues remain.

34. See Manmohan Singh & James Aitken, The (Sizeable) Role of Rehypothecation in the
Shadow Banking System (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/172, July 2010), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10172.pdf.
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Tab
ble 5: Merrilll Lynch International C
Counterpartty Exposure

pital Structurre
B. Cap
Whille a potentiall debtor’s cap
pital structurre is importannt in all typess of
insolvency proceed
dings, in thee insolvencyy of a finanncial instituttion
understtanding the capital
c
structu
ure is even m
more importaant since succh a
compan
ny is rooted in its balance sheet.35 A
And financiall institutions are
quite often more deependent on short-term bborrowing thhan other firrms,
which leaves
l
them exposed
e
to extreme liquiddity needs uppon the onseet of
financiaal distress.36
Table 6 sets fortth balance sheet informaation for Baank of Amerrica,
which shows thiss typical paattern of bborrowing ffor a finanncial
institutiion.37 Just ov
ver 90% of this
t bank’s caapital structuure is compriised
of debtt. The key implication
n for presentt purposes is that both the
preferreed and comm
mon shareho
olders can bbe quickly ddismissed if we
assumee more than a 10% declin
ne in asset vaalues, as mighht occur wheen a
financiaal institution experiences financial disstress.38

35. See Sarah Pei Woo,
W
Simultaneouss Distress of Ressidential Developeers and Their Seccured
Lenders: An
A Analysis of Ban
nkruptcy & Bank Regulation,
R
15 FO
ORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 617, 66
66–68
(2010).
2
36. See Macchiarola, supra note 1, at 297–98.
R After Dodd–F
Frank: Contingentt Capital and the Need
37. See John C. Cofffee, Jr., Systemic Risk
for Regula
atory Strategies Beeyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV
V. 795, 815 (2011)).
38. See generally Faahey v. Malloneee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Elizabethh Warren, Bankruuptcy
Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 77
75, 790 (1987).
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Table 6: Bank of America Balance Sheet (USD Millions)
FQ2 2011
Balance Sheet Assets
+ Cash and Due from Depository
Institutions
+ Trading Account Assets
+ Total Securities
+ Federal Funds & Reverse Repos
+ Net Loans and Leases
+ Bank Premises and Fixed Assets
+ Other Real Estate Owned
+ Goodwill and Other Intangibles
+ All Other Assets

138,389.21
253,123.18
351,463.11
259,708.37
923,898.92
13,792.69
3,915.80
92,891.39
194,135.15

Total Assets

2,264,435.84

+ Total Deposits
+ Federal Funds & Repurchase
Agreements
+ Trading Liabilities
+ Other Borrowed Funds
+ Subordinated Debt
+ All Other Liabilities

1,040,171.86

Total Liabilities

2,041,102.95

Balance Sheet Liabilities

239,520.83
128,299.95
406,814.47
45,678.69
154,843.60

Balance Sheet Equity
+ Perpetual Preferred
+ Common Stock
+ Surplus
+ Undivided Profits
Total Capital

16,562.20
101.33
151,465.35
53,254.47
222,175.60

The bank reports $420 billion in short-term borrowing, including
about $50 billion in money market borrowing and $250 billion in reporelated borrowing, and more than $1 trillion in deposits, divided
between almost $950 billion in domestic deposits and $90 billion in
foreign deposits. These sources of funding are apt to be the unstable
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when a financial institution encounters financial distress.39 For example,
the foreign depositors do not benefit from FDIC insurance, and thus
might be especially likely to flee at the first signs of stress. And a “run”
in repo financing is widely blamed for Lehman’s ultimate collapse.40
Even more importantly for purposes of this paper, these unstable
short term sources of funding show the potential liquidity needs of the
bank during a resolution process. As noted in the bank’s 2010 Form 10K:
If Bank of America Corporation’s or Bank of America, N.A.’s
commercial paper or short-term credit ratings . . . were downgraded by
one or more levels, the potential loss of short-term funding sources such
as commercial paper or repurchase agreement financing and the effect on
our incremental cost of funds would be material.41

As of September 2011, Bank of America had exactly one thousand
different types of debt traded, with an average (median) duration of just
over 5.6 (5.0) years.42 Much of the longer dated debt was issued in the
mid to late 1990s.
Table 7 shows the currency of each of these debt instruments. While
none of the banks’ significant operating companies were located in
Australia or in Continental Europe, we can see from the table that these
two jurisdictions are a substantial source of the banks’ funds.

39. See Karen Brettell & Jonathan Spicer, Update 2—Repo Market Reform Delayed Despite Fed
Push—Sources, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2012, 4:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/financialregulation-triparty-fed-idUSL2E8D9HJU20120209.
40. See generally GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007
(2010); Actions by the New York Fed in Response to Liquidity Pressures in Financial Markets: Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Timothy F.
Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of New York).
41. Bank of America Corp., Form 10-K, supra note 24, at 7.
42. As reported on Bloomberg, supra Table 7.
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Table 7: Outstanding Bank of America Debt by Currency
(September 2011)
Freq.

Percent

Cum. Percent

USD
824
82.4
EUR
41
4.1
AUD
35
3.5
JPY
34
3.4
SGD
10
1
CHF
9
0.9
NZD
9
0.9
CAD
8
0.8
GBP
6
0.6
BRL
5
0.5
MXN
4
0.4
INR
3
0.3
SEK
3
0.3
NOK
2
0.2
TRY
2
0.2
ZAR
2
0.2
CZK
1
0.1
HKD
1
0.1
RUB
1
0.1
Source: Bloomberg

82.4
86.5
90
93.4
94.4
95.3
96.2
97
97.6
98.1
98.5
98.8
99.1
99.3
99.5
99.7
99.8
99.9
100

The bank also reports more than $354 billion in securities among its
assets. Table 8 provides some further information about those
securities.
Table 8: Bank of America Securities (June 2011)
+ US Government Securities
US Treasury Securities
US Govt Agencies
+ Municipals
+ Asset Backed Securities
+ Other Domestic Debt
+ Foreign Debt Securities
+ Equities
Total Securities
Source: Bloomberg

49,269.15
46,571.54
2,697.61
7,645.96
8,048.56
3,624.13
4,579.59
20,431.88
351,463.11
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The purpose of this Article is not to identify what might cause Bank
of America to fail, but rather to examine, assuming such failure, how
such failure might be addressed. In that context, Table 8 is not so much
relevant in identifying possible risk at the bank, but instead because
which might assume that some of these assets could decline in value
during a financial crisis that might accompany the failure of a major
banking institution. That is, many of Bank of America’s assets are apt
to be correlated with its own financial condition, given its prominence in
the financial markets.
Independent of whatever might cause the bank to experience financial
distress, a more generalized decline in financial markets would hit this
part of Bank of America’s balance sheet. It does bear noting that the
U.S. Treasury portion of Table 8 will likely offset some of the
downward movement in other parts of the bank’s securities holdings,
given the typical flight to quality that occurs in times of financial stress.
But this discussion of the Bank of America balance sheet has to this
point considered the bank as a whole. Financial institutions fail as a
whole, but are resolved in pieces. Even after the enactment of Dodd–
Frank, and as will be discussed more fully in Part II, upon failure a
financial institution will be deconstructed into its constituent parts.
Thus, while the consolidated balance sheet can highlight the scope of the
issue at hand, ultimately only the individual, company-by-company
balance sheets of a financial institution are relevant. And, sometimes
the focus on the traditional balance sheet can hide the realities of
modern finance.
Both points are well illustrated by the final table in this Part, which
returns to MLI, the London-based broker–dealer discussed earlier.
Table 9 again reproduces a table from the MLI Basel II report, this time
disclosing MLI’s credit default swap exposure.43

43. For background on CDS contracts, see Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future
of Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 423–24 (2007).
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Table 9:
9 Merrill Lynch Intern
national CDS
S Exposure ((USD Millioons)

The bottom
b
sub-ttable shows that
t MLI has bought $3.22 trillion of C
CDS
protectiion—meanin
ng that MLI will get paidd if there is a default on the
relevan
nt reference entity.
e
Simillarly, MLI hhas also soldd $3.2 trillionn in
credit protection
p
thaat it might someday have to pay out.
In good
g
times these two amounts maay cancel eeach other oout,
especiaally if MLI’s “book” is laargely balancced. In bad times, MLI sits
in the middle of more
m
than $6
6 trillion off total transaactions, perhhaps
paying out on one side
s while faccing a troubled counterpaarty on the otther
side.
As seen
s
from Taable 10, ML
LI apparentlyy holds the bbulk of Bankk of
Americca’s CDS book. Overrall, the bannk has the second larggest
derivatiives portfolio
o in the natio
on, compriseed of more tthan $74 trilllion
(notional amount).44 In the inssured bankingg part of Baank of Amerrica,
r
show
w that the bank held just over $48 trillion of
OCC records
derivatiives, of whicch about $45.5 trillion waas held for trrading purposes.
Recent press reports indicate that Bank of A
America is faacing increassing
pressure to move deerivatives traades to its inssured bankinng affiliates, and
out of Merrill Lyn
nch entities, as the resullt of recent downgradess or
ned downgraades in the baanks’ credit raatings.45
threaten
44. On the balance sheet discussed ab
bove, Bank of Am
merica lists moree than $66.5 billioon of
derivative contracts as assetss. See Kristin N. Johnson,
J
Things F
Fall Apart: Regulaating the Credit Deefault
Swap Com
mmons, 82 U. COLO
O . L. REV. 167
7, 169–73 (2011)); Stephen J. Lubbben, Derivativess and
Bankruptcyy: The Flawed Case for Special Trea
atment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 61 (20009).
45. Bob Ivry et al., BofA
B
Said to Split Regulators
R
over M
Moving Merrill Deerivatives to Bank Unit,
BLOOMBER
RG (Oct. 18, 20
011), http://www.bloomberg.com/nnews/print/2011-100-18/bofa-said-to-splitregulators--over-moving-merrrill-derivatives-to--bank-unit.html.
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In its overseas Basel II disclosure reports, Bank of America notes:
At December 31, 2009, the amount of additional collateral and
termination payments that would be required for such derivatives and
trading agreements was approximately $2.1 billion if the long-term credit
rating of BAC and its subsidiaries was incrementally downgraded by one
level by all ratings agencies. A second incremental one level downgrade
by the ratings agencies would require approximately $1.2 billion in
additional collateral.46

That is, there is a contingent liability or obligation associated with the
bank’s derivative trading, which turns on the status of Bank of
America’s credit rating. As seen in AIG, these sorts of collateral calls
have the effect of draining desirable assets from a financial institution
during the development of financial distress, potentially increasing the
downward pressure on the institution.47
Table 10: Notional Amount of Derivative Contracts, Top 5 Holding
Companies (June 2011, USD Millions)
Rank
1

2
3
4

5

Holding
Company
JPMorgan
Chase & Co.
Bank of
America
Corporation
Morgan
Stanley
Citigroup
Inc.
Goldman
Sachs
Group, Inc.

Total
Derivatives

Futures
(EXCH
TR)

Options
(EXCH
TR)

Forwards
(OTC)

SWAPS
(OTC)

Options
(OTC)

Credit
Derivatives
(OTC)

Spot
FX

78,977,450

1,693,438

2,164,699

11,569,472

47,598,956

9,845,448

6,105,437

469,152

413,117

74,811,101

3,288,994

1,546,806

12,519,496

46,529,779

6,787,645

4,138,382

56,401,634

158,931

1,038,336

7,918,712

35,162,310

6,365,230

5,758,115

442,532

55,186,164

877,517

3,342,856

7,974,039

31,250,476

8,916,014

2,825,262

567,407

53,405,245

1,812,343

3,249,493

4,764,925

29,888,177

9,386,342

4,303,965

359,691

The exchange of collateral in connection with derivatives trading and
other transactions also exposes the bank and its counterparties to risks
associated with the rehypothecation of the collateral. As Bank of
America explains in its 2010 10-K:
The Corporation accepts collateral that it is permitted by contract or
custom to sell or repledge and such collateral is recorded on the
Consolidated Balance Sheet. At December 31, 2010 and 2009, the fair
value of this collateral was $401.7 billion and $418.2 billion of which
$257.6 billion and $310.2 billion were sold or repledged. The primary
sources of this collateral are repurchase agreements and securities
borrowed. The Corporation also pledges securities and loans as collateral
in transactions that include repurchase agreements, securities loaned,
public and trust deposits, U.S. Treasury tax and loan notes, and other
short-term borrowings. This collateral can be sold or repledged by the
46. SELECT MAJOR SUBSIDIARIES, supra note 28.
47. See generally CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND
THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY (2010).
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counterparties to the transactions.48

Rehypothecation of this sort can make it more difficult to unwind a
financial institutions affairs in insolvency, as the debtor’s assets will be
subject to competing and conflicting claims.49
Returning to the specific case of MLI, importantly for purposes of
this Article, upon the hypothetical failure of Bank of America, MLI has
a substantial piece of the CDS market that will either have to moved to
another financial institution with extreme haste, or the CDS market will
experience significant dislocation as parties rush to terminate their MLI
contracts and replace them with new trades.50
And as discussed in the next part of this Article, MLI will remain
outside of any Orderly Liquidation Proceeding commenced with regard
to Bank of America, as MLI is based in London and therefore not
subject to the FDIC’s or the U.S Congress’s jurisdiction. This is an
issue for the roughly 30% of Bank of America entities that operate
outside the United States, but it is especially important with regard to
entities like MLI that have significant operations.
Finally, as discussed in the next part of this Article, different financial
institutions are subject to different resolution procedures, even if the
institutions in question are all subsidiaries of the same financial holding
company. Accordingly, Table 11 identifies the domestic Bank of
America subsidiaries that are subject to special regulatory treatment, and
thus special resolution procedures.
The table is apt to be both over and under inclusive, since an outsider
obviously may not correctly identify the purpose of all of Bank of
America’s myriad subsidiaries.51 Also note that the table only includes
domestic entities: there are clearly several foreign depository banks,
insurance companies, and broker-dealers in the bank’s corporate
structure.52

48. Bank of America Corp., Form 10-K, supra note 24, at 142–43.
49. Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 123,
n.20 (2010).
50. Id. at 123–24; see also generally Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through
Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493 (2009);
Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253 (2009).
51. For example, I have attempted to exclude insurance agencies from the list, but sometimes a
particular subsidiary’s function is less than clear.
52. Likely examples include ML Insurance (IOM) Limited (incorporated in Douglas, Isle of
Man), Merrill Lynch Credit Reinsurance Limited (Hamilton, Bermuda), Merrill Lynch Bank (Suisse)
S.A. (Geneva, Switzerland), and Merrill Lynch Yatirim Bank A.S. (Istanbul, Turkey).
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Table 11: Bank of America Domestic Regulated Subs
Location

Formation
Jurisdiction

Assets (if available;
USD millions)

Balboa Insurance Company

Irvine, CA

California

2,581.00

Balboa Life Insurance Company
Balboa Life Insurance Company of New
York

Irvine, CA

California

43.25

Irvine, CA

New York

18.30

Meritplan Insurance Company

Irvine, CA

California

184.00

Newport Insurance Company

Irvine, CA

Arizona

146.10

Burlington, VT

Vermont

Insurance Companies:

Bank of America Reinsurance Corporation
CW Reinsurance Company

Burlington, VT

Vermont

Investor Protection Insurance Company

Burlington, VT

Vermont

General Fidelity Life Insurance Company

Columbia, SC

South Carolina

Independence One Life Insurance Company

Phoenix, AZ

Arizona

RIHT Life Insurance Company

Phoenix, AZ

Arizona

Summit Credit Life Insurance Company

Phoenix, AZ

Arizona

Charlotte, NC

USA

1,454.05

Portland, OR

USA

8.82

Providence, RI

USA

17.81

San Francisco, CA

USA

15.98

USA

2.90

210.30

Banks (depository and trust):
Bank of America, National Association
Bank of America Oregon, National
Association
Bank of America Rhode Island, National
Association
Bank of America California, National
Association
Bank of America National Trust Delaware

Wilmington, DE

U.S. Trust Company of Delaware
Wilmington, DE
Broker-Dealers (active only, including all types of brokers and
dealers):

Delaware

Merrill Lynch Government Securities Inc.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Incorporated

New York, NY

Delaware

New York, NY

Delaware

297,900.00

Merrill Lynch Professional Clearing Corp.

New York, NY

Delaware

18,145.00

Banc of America Specialist, Inc.

New York, NY

New York

6,028.00

Sources: Bank of America Corporation 2010 10-K; OCC; FDIC Call Reports; SEC; FINRA; Texas Department of
Insurance and NAIC Web Pages

II. RESOLUTION LAW FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
American regulation of financial institutions has historically focused
on a function-by-function approach, and this holds true for the
insolvency law of financial institutions as well. Each specialized area of
the financial institution is typically subject to its own special insolvency
regime, meaning that a large financial holding company with myriad
subsidiaries—like Bank of America—will be subjected to several
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differen
nt insolvency
y regimes. This
T
reality hhas only parrtially improved
with the
t
enactmeent of Dod
dd–Frank’s new Orderrly Liquidattion
Authoriity.
Befo
ore discussing
g OLA, it is helpful to bbriefly sketchh the pre-Doddd–
Frank rules
r
for finaancial institution insolvenncy, to get a better sensee of
what haas changed. Table 12 sum
mmarizes thiss discussion.
Tab
ble 12: Finan
ncial Institu
ution Resoluttion (Pre-Doodd–Frank)

Bank
ks, whetherr state or federally cchartered, aare subject to
receiverrships institu
uted by the FDIC, and overseen byy a Divisionn of
Resoluttions and Receiverships. The receiveership is quitee often centeered
around one or moree purchase an
nd assumptioon agreemennts, whereby the
he failed ban
nks assets annd deposits too another baank.
Corporaation sells th
The salle may be faccilitated by some
s
sort off risk retentioon by the FD
DIC,
but the key aim is to minimizee disruption to the bankking system and
t the FDIC as creditor (by
( virtue off its role as ddeposit insurrer).
losses to
This staands in contrrast with the typical
t
goal oof chapter 111, which is offten
stated as
a maximizattion of the deebtor’s overalll value.
Becaause of the McCarran–
–Ferguson A
Act,53 Congreess has passsed
regulatiion of insu
urance to th
he states. Thus insurrance company
insolvencies are a matter
m
of statte law by virrtue of the coombined effe
fects
of McC
Carran–Fergu
uson and an express
e
exem
mption from the Bankrupptcy
Code.544 Unlike baank receiversships, insuraance companny receivershhips
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2006).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2010). The exem
mption may be imp
mportant, given thaat the Bankruptcy Code
is enacted under express Co
onstitutional autho
ority, and thus migght trump the MccCarran–Fergusonn Act.
See Williaam Goddard, In Between
B
the Trencches: The Jurisdiictional Conflict B
Between a Bankruuptcy
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typically feature court oversight.
As with banks, appointment of a receiver suspends the powers of
management and places the control of the company in the hands of the
receiver.55 Claims are fixed as of the date of the appointment. An
insurer’s policies are typically deemed cancelled on appointment of a
receiver. The estate is not liable for future losses, but policyholders
have valid claims for losses incurred to that point. In many cases, the
policyholders will also have claims for breach of contract against the
estate. And often, policyholder claims have a priority over other
unsecured creditor claims.56
The Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) is the final specialized
resolution procedure relevant to this discussion. Enacted in the 1970s to
deal with the failure of brokerage houses during the “back office
crisis,”57 SIPA provides for some basic insurance protection for
customers of securities brokers, but not commodities or futures brokers,
and sets forth a special insolvency scheme for brokerages.58
SIPA specifically provides for the application of chapters 1, 3 and 5
and subchapters I and II of chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code to the
extent such provisions are not inconsistent with SIPA.59 Both chapter
11 and SIPA proceedings draw on the same general parts of the
Bankruptcy Code to resolve claims and define the basic elements of the
process.60 But SIPA is strictly a liquidation procedure, which makes its
outcome both more certain and less flexible than a chapter 11 case.
SIPA proceedings are commenced in district court and typically

Court and a State Insurance Receivership Court, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 567, 574 (2002).
55. Delaware v. FMC Ins. Co., Inc., No. 6712-VCP (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 2011) (order granting
preliminary
injunction),
available
at
http://www.delawareinsurance.gov/departments/berg/FederalMotor_Files/FederalMotors_StipLiqInjOrd
er-WithConvSignature-20110818.pdf.
56. Patrick Collins, HMO Eligibility for Bankruptcy: The Case for Federal Definitions of
109(b)(2) Entities, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 425, 431 (1994).
57. The back office crisis developed in the late 1960s, when securities trades were still processed
in paper form, but the size of the stock market began to overtake brokers’ ability to process the
paperwork. Because of an underinvestment in infrastructure, several brokers failed and others came
close to failing. See Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection
Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1076–78 (1999);
see also The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: An Early Assessment, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 802
(1973).
58. Richard Carlucci, Harmonizing U.S. Securities and Futures Regulations, 2 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 461, 473 (2008); Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO
Identity Crisis, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317, 326 (2007).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) (2012).
60. SIPA itself is only applicable to broker–dealers required to register under the 1934 Exchange
Act, leaving small broker–dealers and certain foreign broker–dealers subject to certain specialized
provisions of chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. By all accounts, these exceptions are a small minority
of broker–dealers.
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quickly removed to the local bankruptcy court.61 A trustee is appointed
by SIPC—or SIPC itself acts as trustee when a small brokerage is
involved—and the trustee directed to distribute securities to customers
to the greatest extent practicable in satisfaction of their claims against
the debtor. Through such distributions, the customers of a broker–dealer
receive a priority over other, general unsecured creditors who have to
await a more bankruptcy-like distribution, if there are any assets to make
such a distribution.62
SIPA typically applies to investment banks, or at least key parts of
investment banks (i.e., the broker–dealer bits). Thus, while Lehman
Brothers Holdings, Inc. famously filed a chapter 11 petition on
September 15, 2008, one week latter its key broker–dealer subsidiary,
Lehman Brothers, Inc., filed a SIPA petition to facilitate the Lehman
Brothers Holdings’ sale of assets to Barclay’s Capital.
In a world before Dodd–Frank, any part of the financial company not
covered by one of the foregoing special insolvency regimes, including
bank holding companies, was resolved under the Bankruptcy Code.63 In
theory, many foreign parts of the financial institution could also file a
bankruptcy petition, although there may be difficulties in getting such a
petition respected, especially if the subsidiary in question was engaged
in significant activity in the foreign jurisdiction.
How does the creation of OLA change this? Table 13 summarizes the
change, but, in short, OLA potentially replaces chapter 11 as the
resolution tool for bank holding companies and their non-regulated
subsidiaries. It only potentially displaces chapter 11 because chapter 11
remains in place unless financial regulators decide to invoke OLA,64
through a comically byzantine process that culminates with the D.C.
District court having 24 hours to say “no” under very limited
circumstances.65
And, OLA does not supplant FDIC bank receiverships, state

61. 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(4) (2012); see also Peloro v. United States, 488 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir.
2007).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a) (2012).
63. Until passage of the Dodd–Frank Act, a Bank Holding Company was subject to regulation by
the Federal Reserve, but there was no specialized insolvency system for these entities. The Bank
Holding Company Act defines “bank holding company” as any company that “has control over any
bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue” of the Act. “Any
company has control over a bank or over any company if: “(A) the company directly or indirectly or
acting through one or more other persons owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum or more of
any class of voting securities of the bank or company; (B) the company controls in any manner the
election of a majority of the directors or trustees of the bank or company; or (C) the Board determines,
after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling
influence over the management or policies of the bank or company.” 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (2011).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 5382(c)(1) (2010); see id. §§ 5388, 5383(b)(2) (2010).
65. Id. § 5382 (2010); see also id. § 5383 (2011).
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insurance receiverships, or SIPA liquidation procedures, although the
story with regard to SIPA is not quite as clear that would suggest.66 As
explained below, OLA largely overrides the provisions of SIPA, without
wanting to appear to do so.
In essence, OLA expands the FDIC’s bank receivership powers to
cover a greater part of the financial institution.67 This allows the FDIC
to conduct a purchase and assumption transaction with regard to nonbank parts of the institution, or transfer the institution to a newly created
“bridge bank.”68 The latter allows the FDIC to split the good assets
from the bad, in a process that is very much like that used in “363 sales”
under chapter 11, widely publicized by the automotive chapter 11
cases.69
The key distinction with chapter 11 is that the FDIC acts without
court oversight or the need to give notice before it acts.70 Thus, while
the Lehman 363 sale happened after one week’s notice to the
stakeholders, the OLA equivalent could happen within seconds of the
OLA proceeding’s commencement.71
The statute grants FDIC a one-day stay on counterparties’ ability to
terminate their derivative contracts.72
This contrasts with the
Bankruptcy Code, which, particularly after 2005, excepts a wide range
of derivative contracts—and things that look like derivative contracts—
from the normal operation of the Code.
And equally importantly, the OLA procedure can be self-funded by
the FDIC.73 This obviates the need to secure private debtor-inpossession (DIP) financing,74 something that might be especially
difficult to obtain during a financial crisis, especially if one considers
the scale of the funding needs of most large financial institutions.75

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. §§ 5383(e), 5385, 5381(a)(8) (2010).
Id. § 5384(b) (2010).
See id. § 5390 (2010).
See generally Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83
AM. BANKR. L. J. 531 (2009); Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J. Lubben, Sales or Plans: A Comparative
Account of the “New” Corporate Reorganization, 56 MCGILL L.J. 591 (2011).
70. Paul L. Lee, The Dodd–Frank Act Orderly Liquidation Authority: A Preliminary Analysis
and Critique - Part II, 128 BANKING L.J. 867, 899 (2011).
71. Mark A. McDermott & David M. Turetsky, Restructuring Large, Systemically-Important,
Financial Companies: An Analysis of the Orderly Liquidation Authority, Title II of the Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 401, 421 (2011).
72. Douglas E. Deutsch & Eric Daucher, Dodd–Frank’s Liquidation Scheme: Basics for
Bankruptcy Practitioners, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2011.
73. Jamieson L. Hardee, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act:
The Orderly Liquidation Authority: The Creditor’s Perspective, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 259, 275
(2011).
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012).
75. See 12 U.S.C. § 5384(d) (2010).
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Table 13: Finan
ncial Instituttion Resolutiion (After D
Dodd–Frank))

ortunately, th
he FDIC must
m
requestt that Treassury supply its
Unfo
funding
g, and the Trreasury is au
uthorized to impose connditions on suuch
funding
g. Thus, thee FDIC migh
ht not actuallly have acceess to funding if
politicaal consideratiions cause the Treasury too impose oneerous conditiions
on the funding.
f
Butt this concern
n, although raaised in the lliterature, seeems
somewh
hat hypothetiical, since the Secretary ccould just as easily avoid the
entire isssue by disalllowing the OLA
O
filing inn the first insttance.76
This funding also supplants the Federal Reserve’s foormer abilityy to
lend dirrectly to non-banks in tim
mes of crisis.777 Now the F
Federal Reseerve
and thee Treasury only have thee power to leend across inndustries, whhile
any firm
m-specific lending must be
b done throuugh the FDIC
C in the conttext
of an OLA
O
proceed
ding. FDIC’ss powers outside of OLA
A have also bbeen
greatly curtailed.78
This might be prroblematic.799 Obviouslyy, the cost off any bailouut in

76. E.g., Morgan Riccks, The Case for Regulating the Shhadow Banking Syystem (Working P
Paper,
2011) (on file with author).
–Frank Act: TARP
P Bailout Backlashh and Too Big to Fail,
77. Lissa Lamkin Brroome, The Dodd–
15 N.C. BANKING
A
INST. 69, 78
7 (2011).
78. For example, du
uring the financiaal crisis the FDIC
C announced a ttemporary Transaaction
Account Guarantee
G
Program
m, giving deposito
ors unlimited insuurance coverage foor non-interest beearing
transaction
n accounts if theiir bank was a paarticipant in the F
FDIC’s Temporaryy Liquidity Guaraantee
Program. Non-interest
N
bearin
ng checking accou
unts include demaand deposit accounnts and any transaaction
account that has unlimited withdrawals
w
and th
hat cannot earn intterest. Also includded were other inteerestbearing ch
hecking accounts, Money Market Deposit Accountss, savings accounnts and Certificatees of
Deposit. This
T program was large than the con
ntroversial TARP pprogram, and arguuably played a keyy role
in stabilizing the financial sy
ystem.
79. See Jeffrey Man
nns, Building Beetter Bailouts: Thhe Case for a L
Long-Term Investtment
Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349,
1
1382 (2011).
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terms of taxpayer costs, moral hazard, and reduced market discipline,
will sometimes overwhelm the costs of allowing any particular
institution to fail. But in the specific cases of depository banks, since
the 1930s the general assumption has been that any bank failure might
result in contagion, hence the need for system wide deposit insurance.
And in times of market-wide dislocation, it has long been accepted that
it can be socially useful for central banks to provide liquidity, and even
recapitalization, to avoid the panic that would result from the failure of a
specific financial institution.80
That such lending now can be done only after the failure of the
institution is announced represents a bet that the announcement of an
OLA proceeding will not itself overwhelm the benefits of the FDIC’s
lending to the institution. It seems equally likely that putting an
institution into OLA will trigger a chain reaction of panic and failures
throughout the system that could result in a severe contraction of money
and credit in the financial system, which could result in the need to
conduct several OLA proceedings in parallel.
There is also the question of whether the analogy that Dodd–Frank
makes between bank receivership and financial institution failure holds
up to careful scrutiny.81 For example, the FDIC’s technique of choice is
to find a buyer to whom to sell the troubled bank, but in times of
systemic crisis there might well be no buyers large enough or confident
enough to perform a similar function with regard to a large financial
institution.82 At the very least, there might be a need for FDIC to
heavily subsidize the sale, a point in some tension with the notion that
Dodd–Frank has ended bailouts. Moreover, given the limited number of
buyers in even the best of times, arguably the market for very large
financial institutions will never be competitive, and will always function
as a “buyers’ market.”
Similarly, although the FDIC has considerable experience resolving
banks under its bank receivership powers, it has no experience resolving
a domestic or global diversified financial institution.83 The FDIC could
80. Paul Krugman, Financial Romanticism, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2011, 6:27 PM),
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/financial-romanticism/.
81. Paul L. Lee, The Dodd–Frank Act Orderly Liquidation Authority: A Preliminary Analysis
and Critique - Part I, 128 BANKING L.J. 771, 781 (2011).
82. David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 109–17 (2010).
83. The new regime is also different from a bank resolution in that losses must be imposed on
the unsecured creditors, even to the extent of clawing back payments previously made under the FDIC’s
liquidity powers. Any remaining losses after creditors have repaid their share are to be covered by ex
post assessments on surviving large financial institutions. In short, unlike bank receivership where an
ex ante insurance fund exists to pay losses, Dodd–Frank rests on the premise that such a fund can be
created ex post. Prefunding may have made OLA more usable, and one can surmise this is exactly why
the argument that pre-funding would “institutionalize bailouts” was surfaced. One can also reasonably
doubt Congress’ will to impose ex post assessments on financial institutions in the face of concerted

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss2/4

26

Lubben: Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B of A in OLA

2012]

B OF A IN OLA

511

be aided in the OLA process by the requirement that financial
institutions file resolution plans before the first signs of trouble, and the
powers that regulators have to order financial institutions to rationalize
their corporate structures. But some commentators have raised
legitimate issues about whether regulators will have the long-term
willpower to enforce these provisions to their fullest extent.84
The interface between OLA and FDIC bank receiverships, state
insurance receiverships, or SIPA liquidation procedures is also
somewhat problematic. As noted at the outset, OLA does not supplant
any of these specialized procedures.85
And particularly with regard to bank and insurance company
receiverships, the status quo prevails and the FDIC as OLA receiver will
have to interact with the receivers of these pieces of the financial
institution. Of course, in the case of a bank, the FDIC will be
interacting with itself, but the FDIC as bank receiver operates under a
different set of statutory instructions86 than the FDIC as OLA receiver.87
In the case of broker–dealers, the process is somewhat more
confused.88 A close reading of the relevant provision actually suggests
that the FDIC can be appointed receiver of a broker–dealer under
OLA.89 But the statute then instructs the FDIC to appoint SIPC as
trustee for the broker–dealer. The Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC) is then instructed to “promptly” file a SIPA petition
with the “with any Federal district court of competent jurisdiction
specified in section 78u or 78aa of Title 15.”90
Thus commences a SIPA case, with some notable exceptions.91 First,
SIPC normally appoints an outside trustee in all but the smallest cases.
Under OLA, SIPC, which lacks experience liquidating large broker–
dealers, is placed in charge. But SIPC will not have the full powers of a

lobbying and general concerns about causing a new round of distress in the financial industry. See
generally Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd–Frank’s
Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151 (2011). But
cf.12 U.S.C. § 5394 (2010).
84. See Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust
Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1390 (2011).
85. Hollace T. Cohen, Orderly Liquidation Authority: A New Insolvency Regime to Address
Systemic Risk, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1143, 1151 (2011).
86. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (2011).
87. Id. § 5386 (2010).
88. See id. § 5385 (2010).
89. Id. § 5385(a) (“Upon the appointment of the Corporation as receiver for any covered broker
or dealer, the Corporation shall . . . .”).
90. Id. § 5385(a)(2)(A). Notably, this is not apt to be the D.C. District Court, who may have had
the initial task of reviewing the OLA petition.
91. That Dodd–Frank orders a court to enter a petition in these cases might be subject to some
constitutional concerns. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 429–30 (1995).
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normal SIPA trustee; instead it is powerless to interfere with the FDIC’s
decision to transfer assets to a new purchaser or bridge institution.
SIPC’s role is primarily limited to dealing with the debris remaining
after the FDIC takes charge of the broker–dealer. SIPC is placed in the
difficult position. For example, they are told to essentially leave the
FDIC to do its thing, while the statute also provides that SIPC should
not do anything to “adversely affect the rights of a customer to customer
property or customer name securities.”92 Fortunately for SIPC, the
statute also tells the district court to stand down once the SIPA petition
is granted.93
Essentially, Dodd–Frank uses the OLA process to override the
existing SIPA process, without having the willingness to say so. In this
light, the otherwise puzzling decision to appoint SIPC as trustee makes
sense, because an outsider might find it difficult to be a “trustee” under
the conditions imposed by Dodd–Frank.
OLA will give the FDIC strong powers over much of a financial
institution, save for insurance companies and banks. Coordination of
the bank resolution process with the OLA process should be possible—
given the unitary identity of the OLA trustee and the bank receiver—but
it will require the FDIC to gloss over its schizophrenic responsibilities
under Dodd–Frank on the one hand, and the general banking statutes on
the other.
OLA is also somewhat less “global” than chapter 11—most of its
provisions are expressly limited to domestic entities, whereas chapter 11
potentially applies to any entity with assets in the United States.94
Given the nature of modern financial institutions—there really is no
such thing as a purely domestic financial institution—coordination
across borders is key, and that issue remains unresolved by Dodd–
Frank.95
Thus we can expect that any cross-border coordination of resolution
procedures will have to happen on an informal basis among regulators.
As seen in Lehman, however, sometimes the regulators are not fully
aware of the global insolvency system. One can only hope that this
improves in light of recent events. But no matter what happens in this
regard investors are unlikely to get the certainty they might have hoped
for from Dodd–Frank.
We should also remember that a lot has changed in the past few years
that might make financial institution failure less likely, or at least less
92.
93.
94.
95.

12 U.S.C. § 5385(d).
Id. § 5385(c).
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2010).
See MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT ET AL., BALANCING THE BANKS: GLOBAL LESSONS FROM THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS122–29 (2010).
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traumatic. New regulations of financial institutions under Dodd–Frank,
Basel III, and other initiatives all will influence how OLA operates, and
whether it ever needs to be invoked. More broadly, the better the ex
ante regulation, the less likely OLA will ever be needed.
III. BANK OF AMERICA IN OLA
Bank of America’s entry into the orderly liquidation process would
trigger state insurance receiverships in California, New York, Arizona,
South Carolina, and Vermont. Six FDIC bank receiverships would
commence. At least four SIPA brokerage liquidations would be filed.96
The holding company and any unregulated, domestic subsidiaries would
enter OLA proceedings, where they would come under the control of the
FDIC.
The assets in the foregoing entities would be immediately severed
from the assets in key foreign subsidiaries, like Merrill Lynch S.A. or
Banc of America Securities Limited.97 Based on the experience in
Lehman, this may result in these subsidiaries losing access to shared
computer and cash management systems, threatening their ability to
survive as independent entities. Thus, even if these companies are
separately capitalized and otherwise viable, they will experience
extreme business disruption unless contingency plans are in place well
before the occurrence of financial distress.
Given that it was reported that a large part—approximately 85%—of
Bank of America assets are reportedly in the United States, it would be
easy to assume that the FDIC in one of its capacities will quickly take
charge of the bulk of the company.98 But it is equally possible that
foreign subsidiaries of the bank might have claims on those assets, no
matter what their location. Moreover, the reporting of derivatives trades
on a “net” basis means that assuming asset location correlates with
importance may be extremely imprudent. In short, it is unclear precisely
how much of Bank of America will fall under FDIC control, acting as
either OLA trustee or bank receiver.
But whatever part of the bank falls within the FDIC’s jurisdiction, it
will have to act fast to protect the value of the debtor, especially with
regard to its derivatives trading book (assuming it is domestically held at

96. This assumes FDIC would attempt to resolve the entire financial institution. More recently
the FDIC has suggested that it might simply attempt to put the parent company into OLA, and use the
funding described in this Part to keep the subsidiaries operating outside of OLA. While such an
approach would be sensible, FDIC would undoubtedly face some political risks, as this would amount to
a bailout of creditors—including derivatives counterparties—at the subsidiary level.
97. See supra Table 2 for a list of Bank of America’s self-identified key operating subsidiaries.
98. See supra Table 3.
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the time of the OLA filing). As such, the path FDIC will follow seems
relatively clear. First, the FDIC will move the valuable and systemically
important parts of the company to a bridge bank. Next, it will move the
entire derivative portfolio—or at least the entire domestic derivatives
portfolio—to the bridge bank as well. While here it might be tempting
to only move the “good” or in the money trades to the bridge bank,
Dodd–Frank’s prohibition on splitting positions against any single
counterparty, and the reality that the FDIC must act with 24 hours,
makes any deep analysis of derivative trades unlikely. This sort of
wholesale transfer does, of course, amount to a windfall for some
counterparties who suddenly get the benefit of a much more creditorworthy partner. The third step would be to remove Bank of America’s
senior management. Dodd–Frank requires no less.
Finally, the FDIC would have to arrange a sensible liquidation of the
remainder of the Bank of America. That is, the scraps left out of the
new bridge bank would have to be financed to facilitate their liquidation.
Eventually it seems likely that some sort of liquidating trust, as is often
used in large chapter 11 cases, might be used to allow the creditors of
the “bad bank” to manage their own recovery in some sort of collective
sense. The trick here will be managing the tension between creditors
who want rapid repayment, while avoiding fire sales of distressed
securities, which might have further effects on an already depressed
market. That, at a very abstract level, is how OLA might be applied to
Bank of America. Of course, each of these broad steps raises important
concerns and questions.
Most fundamentally, will it be possible to cleanly separate Bank of
America into its good and bad parts? This is the area where the FDIC,
through the living wills provisions and its other oversight tools, must
both understand and reformat Bank of America in a way that will
facilitate the transfer to the bridge bank. At present, it seems highly
unlikely that the bank, with its more than 2,000 subsidiaries, could be
split into good and bad banks without serious disruption to the bank, and
thus the entire financial system.
This is also an area where the international component of the bank
should be addressed. In particular, the living will for any global
financial institution should explain how the foreign pieces of the bank
would be separated from the American bank.
As Richard W. Fisher, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas, stated recently, “there is scant chance that managers of $1
trillion or $2 trillion banking enterprises can possibly ‘know their
customer,’ follow time-honored principles of banking and fashion
reliable risk management models for organizations as complex as these
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megabanks have become.”99 This reality would become even more
acute during a financial crisis, when the FDIC as receiver is even less
likely to have such knowledge.
Nonetheless, FDIC would have to operate the bridge bank, which
contains the better parts of Bank of America. This will mean funding
the bridge bank with the idea that FDIC will get back its costs from the
industry at some point in the future.
Here, I think we have to worry about FDIC’s ability to run a major
financial institution, markedly larger than any bank it has ever operated
under its receivership powers. Moreover, market conditions are apt to
be rather turbulent following the takeover of an institution of Bank of
America’s size. Traditionally the FDIC has favored sales to other banks
when it has had to deal with a big bank failure.100 But will anyone be
able or interested in buying Bank of America following its failure?
Certainly it would seem to make little sense to add even the good bits of
the bank to any of the existing, very large domestic banks.101
That leaves the second tier banks—think US Bancorp and PNC
Financial Services Group—as potential suitors, or foreign financial
institutions, like Barclay’s, who bought Lehman out of chapter 11. The
question is whether any of the second tier banks would want to join the
top tier, and whether regulators should allow them to do so. A similar
calculus will be at work with foreign entities, whose regulators must
worry about recreating “too big to fail” problems in the buying
institution.
And also remember that Bank of America has been somewhat
dismembered at this point—both by the limited scope of OLA and by
the international pieces being pulled out—so some of its attraction may
be gone. Lehman had exactly one bidder for its assets, and now that
bank has a U.S. broker–dealer. Who remains?
FDIC gets out of this problem in their Lehman hypothetical by
assuming a buyer who is willing to pay book value—but the present
exercise is aimed at a somewhat more realistic analysis.
As an alternative, FDIC could continue to fund the bridge bank until
the markets stabilize, and the bridge could then be recapitalized through

99. Richard W. Fisher, Remarks before Columbia University’s Politics and Business Club:
Taming the Too-Big-to-Fails: Will Dodd–Frank Be the Ticket or Is Lap-Band Surgery Required? (Nov.
15, 2011), available at http://dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2011/fs111115.cfm. As a remedy,
Fisher proposed “downsizing the behemoths over time into institutions that can be prudently
managed . . . .”
100. E.g., Press Release, FDIC, U.S. Bank National Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, Assumes All
of the Deposits of BankEast, Knoxville, Tennessee (Jan. 27, 2012), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2012/pr12013.html.
101. And doing so would require waiver of Dodd–Frank’s concentration limits.
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an IPO.102 This would expose FDIC to high degrees of market and
political risk, but end in the best overall outcome. Nonetheless, this
model looks much more like the model used in the GM case—which
most people would not term a “liquidation,” despite Dodd–Frank’s
putative rule that all future financial institutions should suffer that fate.
Ultimately, there may be many good reasons to break up the largest
U.S. banks. In many respects, they are not unlike the conglomerates of
the 1960s, pursuing several lines of business on the basis of purported
economies of scale that may exist more in the minds of their CEO than
in reality.103 But in any event, it seems unlikely that the ideal moment to
break up these banks will be at the point of crisis. And it seems equally
unlikely that these institutions will divide neatly along geographical
lines—yet that is precisely what Dodd–Frank’s OLA is premised on.
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Given OLA’s admitted shakiness, why not use the Bankruptcy Code?
After all, chapter 11 benefits from decades of understanding about how
to restructure a financially distressed company. And several extremely
large companies, including financial institutions like Lehman and
Drexel Burnham Lambert, have successfully used chapter 11.
The most prominent proposal to use the Code in place of OLA
actually calls for a new chapter 14, proposed by members of the
Resolution Project at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.104 In
short, proposed chapter 14 would apply to all financial institutions with
assets of more than $100 billion.105 Petitions could be filed either
voluntarily (by the institution) or involuntarily (by regulators). Cases
would be overseen by “a small . . . and specialized panel of district court
judges and special masters . . . .”106 Otherwise, the cases would proceed
under normal provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, subject to modified
treatment of derivatives and repos, as outlined in a companion article by
Skeel and Jackson.107 The stated goal is to take the government out of
102. See Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 Ind. L.J.
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1924831.
103. Sheila Bair, Why It’s Time to Break Up the ‘Too Big to Fail’ Banks, CNNMONEY (Jan. 18,
2012, 10:56 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/01/18/big-banks-break-up-bair/?iid=SF_F_Lead.
104. Thomas H. Jackson et al., Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions: Orderly Liquidation
Authority and a New Chapter 14, in STUDIES BY THE RESOLUTION PROJECT AT STANFORD
UNIVERSITY’S HOOVER INSTITUTION WORKING GROUP ON ECONOMIC POLICY (2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/June/20110620/OP-1418/OP1418_061511_81311_544434921739_1.pdf.
105. Twenty-four bank or financial holding companies fit that definition at the end of 2011, major
regional banks like Union Bank of California and KeyCorp, would not be covered.
106. Jackson et al., supra note 104, at 1–6.
107. David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in
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the insolvency process, as the proponents argue that involves political
distortion of the market.
The key difficulty with any such use of the Bankruptcy Code rests on
funding. The chapter 14 proposal supposes the use of a modified
version of the present section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code, the statutory
support for the well-known DIP loans in chapter 11 cases.108
Before the financial crisis, Lyondell Chemical received the largest
commercial DIP loan on record: $8 billion. That loan was arranged by
Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and the Royal Bank of
Scotland, and funded by thirteen financial institutions, including
commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and private equity
funds.
General Motors received a $33 billion DIP loan, from the U.S.
Treasury.109 That remains the largest DIP loan ever. The total value of
the ten largest DIP loans in the 2011 was $3 billion, one third of which
involved a single loan arranged by Bank of America. In 2010, the total
value of the fifteen largest DIP loans was $7 billion, of which $725
million, comprising four loans, was arranged by Bank of America. Bank
of America currently has liquidity needs of more than $400 billion.
Relying on the commercial DIP market—especially during a financial
crisis—for a DIP loan of anything near this size seems more than
implausible. The number of financial institutions that would have to be
involved would be massive—perhaps as many as 650, if the proportion
were the same as the Lyondell DIP loan. There is no way a loan of this
size could be arranged without starting a run on Bank of America.
Dodd–Frank solves this problem with the funding mechanism discussed
earlier, and that mechanism or something like it is a prerequisite to a
viable resolution authority.110
And once we concede the need for government funding, the notion
that the government will not ultimately be in control of the process
seems little more than naïve. After all, until the automotive cases, it was
widely agreed that a private lender was entitled to “call the shots” in any
case in which it provided the debtor’s means to keep operating.111
Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 153–54 (2012).
108. Jameson Rice, Changes in Debtor-in-Possession Financing Following the Financial
Collapse of 2008, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 312, 313 (2010).
109. Michael D. De La Merced, G.M. Wins Final Approval of DIP Financing, N.Y. TIMES (June
25, 2009, 12:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/06/25/gm-wins-final-approval-of-dipfinancing/.
110. Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 101
(2012).
111. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751,
784–85 (2002); M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation when
Agency Costs Are Low, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1570 (2007); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball:
The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 923 (2003). After the
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Similarly, the chapter 14 proposal touts its benefit as a transparent,
court-based process, it does little to address the speed needed to address
financial distress in this context. The new OLA obtains most of its
benefits from its rather limited version of due process, which is both
troubling and necessary.112 Lehman was able to use the ordinary
bankruptcy process to achieve a sale of its broker–dealer within one
week, but that only came about as a result of the Federal Reserve’s
willingness to support the sale process. Arguably the Fed no longer has
that power, and the proponents of chapter 14 do not seem to provide any
alternative.
More importantly, remember again that Lehman is comparatively
small when measured against the likes of Bank of America. The
financial markets need to know the plan, and they need to know it
quickly when a major bank fails.113 OLA clearly wins on this point,
and, as noted above, many of the due process concerns will fade if FDIC
can provide greater clarity on when OLA might be invoked.114
Finally, it would seem that the chapter 14 proponents wanted judicial
expertise, but were unwilling to embrace that expertise when it came in
the form of non-Article III bankruptcy judges.115 If true restructuring
experience is desired, the bankruptcy judges in Delaware and the
Southern District of New York seem like the obvious choice, but the
chapter 14 proposal instead goes with district court judges, who see
chapter 11 cases on appeal, if at all.116 As between a district judge and
FDIC, it appears that there is little to be gain from replacing OLA with
chapter 14. In short, while a bankruptcy-based process would
undoubtedly be preferable, given the gains in transparency and
legitimacy, it would necessarily involve OLA-like funding and timing
provisions.117 This is something more than bankruptcy with a few
tweaks.
And chapter 14 does nothing to solve the international component of
the problem, which arguably is the biggest issue looming over the entire
topic. After all, while Lehman is out of chapter 11, its New York

automotive cases, certain proponents of that view seemed to change their mind. See Lubben, No Big
Deal, supra note 69; see also Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108
MICH. L. REV. 727, 731–32 (2010).
112. Randall D. Guynn, Are Bailouts Inevitable?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 153 (2012).
113. Alison M. Hashmall, After the Fall: A New Framework to Regulate “Too Big to Fail” NonBank Financial Institutions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 851 (2010).
114. Acknowledging that FDIC is only partially able to commit to any strategy in this regard,
given the role of the Secretary.
115. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
116. Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 747, 781 (2010).
117. See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 487 (2011).
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broker–dealer and its London broker–dealer continue to fight over
ownership of assets in both bankruptcy estates. Given that all large
financial institutions are international financial institutions, the failure to
tackle the key issue leaves the biggest piece of the problem unaddressed.
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